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CASENOTES
BUCKEYE CHECK CASHING, INC. v. CARDEGNA:
THE LATEST EXAMPLE OF HOW THE SUPREME
COURT HAS TURNED THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT INTO A STATE-DEFYING MONSTROSITY
BRIAN C. GROESSER*
INTRODUCTION
A consumer today often enters into a business contract that con-
tains an arbitration provision. It is unlikely that the average consumer
interested in buying a new cellular phone, for instance, would read an
arbitration provision within the phone's contract. Furthermore, if the
consumer did read the provision, it is unlikely that he would be able to
ascertain its meaning and legal ramifications without some legal edu-
cation. If a legal dispute arises from this transaction and is within the
scope of the arbitration provision, it will be settled through arbitration
according to the contract. But what if the contract itself is illegal?
Does the consumer still have to go before an arbitrator to present his
case or does he have the option to go through the courts? According
to the United States Supreme Court in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, the arbitrator remains the appropriate trier of fact.'
Should a dispute claiming that a contract is illegal and unenforce-
able be settled through arbitration if the provision compelling arbitra-
tion is part of an illegal contract? Before the Supreme Court heard
Buckeye, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that enforcing an arbitra-
tion agreement within an unlawful contract would violate the state's
public policy and contract law.2 This casenote explores how Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna expanded the scope of federal power
* B.A. with Distinction, University of Michigan, 2003; Second-year law student at North
Carolina Central University School of Law; I would first like to give God the glory for the
opportunity to attend law school. I also want to thank Professor Adrienne Fox for inspiring me
to research the growing practice of arbitration. My parents, John and Sarah, deserve most of the
credit for aiding me in my education. Finally, I want to thank and dedicate this article to my
wife, Ali, and our daughter, Ava.
1. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (Buckeye II), No. 04-1264, slip. op. at 1 (U.S.
Feb. 21, 2006).
2. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (Buckeye 1), 894 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2005),
rev'd, Buckeye II, No. 04-1264, slip. op. at 1 (the Florida Supreme Court believed that Cardegna
1
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enforcing arbitration provisions under the Federal Arbitration Act
(hereinafter FAA).3 Buckeye is the most recent decision expanding
the scope of the FAA since Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.4 introduced the Separability Doctrine in 1967.5
This note argues that Buckeye is the latest example that federal power
has exceeded the original purpose and intent of the FAA, and that
states are now unjustifiably unable to protect their own residents with
regards to illegal contracts involving arbitration provisions.
This note will first discuss the facts surrounding Buckeye. It will
then explore the history that led to the Buckeye decision. The history
will begin with the establishment of the United States Arbitration Act
(now known as the Federal Arbitration Act) and a discussion of its
purpose and intent. This note will then focus on the lineage of case
law that Buckeye arises from, starting with Prima Paint. Justices have
continuously disagreed on the scope of the FAA, starting with a
lengthy dissent from Justice Black in Prima Paint. This note will dis-
cuss both sides to landmark cases in the lineage such as Prima Paint
and Southland Corp. v. Keating.6 Finally, this note will analyze Buck-
eye in the context of its role in expanding federal power and how that
expansion is inappropriate.
THE CASE
John Cardegna entered into various deferred-payment transactions
with Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. in which he received cash in ex-
change for a personal check in the amount of the cash plus a finance
charge.7 In each transaction, Cardegna signed a "Deferred Deposit
Agreement" which included two arbitration provisions.8 The first
provision, called "Arbitration Disclosure," alerted the signors that
signing the document meant that any dispute arising from the Agree-
ment would be resolved by binding arbitration.9 The second provi-
sion, called "Arbitration Provisions," defined the type of binding
arbitration discussed in the first provision." In part, the second provi-
entered into a void contract with Buckeye Check Cashing since the contract charged usurious
interest rates in violation of state contract law).
3. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.S. §§ 1-16 (2007).
4. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
5. The Supreme Court created the Separability Doctrine, which separated an arbitration
provision from the contract as a whole. In Prima Paint, a claim of inducement by fraud applied
to the contract as a whole and not to the arbitration provision in particular, thus making the
claim appropriate for an arbitrator to decide.
6. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
7. Buckeye 11, No. 04-1264, slip. op. at 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
2
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sion stated "[t]his arbitration Agreement is made pursuant to a trans-
action involving interstate commerce and shall be governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act."11
Cardegna brought a putative class action claim in a Florida state
court, alleging that Buckeye charged usurious interest rates and that
the Agreement violated various Florida lending and consumer protec-
tion laws. 12 Buckeye moved to compel arbitration.13 The trial court
denied the motion, holding that a court rather than an arbitrator
should resolve a claim that a contract is illegal and therefore void. 4
The Florida District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District re-
versed.1 5 The court held that the agreement to arbitrate was enforcea-
ble since Cardegna claimed that the entire contract was void and did
not challenge the arbitration provision itself. 6 Therefore, an arbitra-
tor should determine the question of the contract's legality.' 7
Cardegna appealed and the Florida Supreme Court reversed.' 8 Quot-
ing Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton,19 the court reasoned that enforcing
an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful "could
breathe life into a contract that ... violates state law." 20
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The Court applied Prima
Paint"' and Southland Corp.22 to its holding.23 The Court held that:
(1) as a matter of substantive law, the arbitration provision is severa-
ble from the remainder of the contract; (2) if the challenge is not to
the arbitration clause itself then the contract's validity is considered
by the arbitrator; and (3) the FAA applies in both state and federal
courts.24 Utilizing those three propositions, the Court held that an
arbitrator and not a court must resolve the dispute.25
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
20. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (Buckeye 1), 894 So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla. 2005),
rev'd Buckeye II, No. 04-1264, slip. op. at 1.
21. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
22. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
23. Buckeye H, No. 04-1264, slip. op. at 5.
24. Id.
25. Id.
3
Groesser: Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna: The Latest Example of Ho
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2007
2007] BUCKEYE CHECK CASHING, INC. V. CARDEGNA 253
BACKGROUND
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act.26 Prior to
1925, several major commercial states had passed arbitration laws that
the federal courts refused to enforce in federal diversity cases.27 The
enactment established a procedure requiring federal courts to enforce
the arbitration agreements.28 Thirteen years after the enactment, the
Supreme Court decided in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2 9 that the
federal government did not have the power to create substantive law
solely by virtue of the Article III power to control federal court juris-
diction.30 Therefore, after Erie, the FAA would be considered uncon-
stitutional if Congress enacted it as "general federal law" since the
Court held that federal general common law did not exist.3 1 The
Court in Erie held that, except in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case
is the law of the appropriate state as governed by choice of law princi-
ples.32 Essentially, when a federal court is hearing a diversity case
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the court must apply state substantive law.3 3
Therefore, after Erie, the federal courts had to consider the FAA as a
procedural law, not a substantive law, in order to avoid constitutional
issues. The procedural approach appears to be consistent with the in-
tent of the FAA's drafters. Julius Cohen,34 the American Bar Associ-
ation member who drafted the bill, stated before Congress that the
proposed bill related to the law of remedies and not to substantive
law.3 5 At hearings on the FAA, congressional subcommittees were
told that "[t]he theory on which you [Congress] do this is that you
have the right to tell the Federal courts how to proceed."36 The Amer-
ican Bar Association Committee, which drafted and pressed for pas-
sage of the legislation, wrote: "[t]he statute establishes a procedure in
the federal courts for the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
37
26. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.S. §§ 1-16 (2007).
27. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 34; see, e.g., Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F.
319 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) affd, 5 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1924); Lappe v. Wilcox, 14 F.2d 861 (N.D.N.Y.
1926) (holding that New York's arbitration statute could not affect the jurisdiction of the federal
courts).
28. 9 U.S.C.S. §§ 1-16 (effective Feb. 12, 1925).
29. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
30. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 23.
31. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. "Julius Henry Cohen [was the] drafter of the New York statute that served as the basis
for the FAA." John D. Feerick, Professor at Fordham Univ. School of Law, Keynote Speaker at
the American Arbitration Association Anniversary Lecture Series: Federal Arbitration Act at
80: A Tribute (Oct. 25, 2004), at 2 n.8.
35. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 27.
36. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
4
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Eighteen years after Erie, in 1956, the Supreme Court decided
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.38 Bernhardt involved an employment
contract dispute between a resident of Vermont and his New York
corporate employer.3 9 The employee's duties under the contract were
to be carried out in Vermont.4 ° The contract contained a provision
that any dispute was subject to arbitration under New York law by the
American Arbitration Association 41 whose findings are final and
binding.42 The suit was removed from a Vermont court to a federal
district court on diversity grounds.43 The New York corporation
moved for a stay of the proceeding to compel arbitration in New York
City applying New York law.44 The district court ruled that Vermont
law made an arbitration agreement revocable at any time prior to the
furnishing of an award.45 On appeal, the Supreme Court applied Erie
and stated that Vermont law, 46 and not New York law, would gov-
ern.47 In so doing, the Court held that the duty to arbitrate a contract
dispute is substantive and therefore a matter governed by state law in
a federal suit invoking diversity jurisdiction.48
After Bernhardt, concern arose as to whether the FAA could only
be applied in federal court cases arising under federal law and not
diversity cases. The argument disallowing application of the FAA in
diversity cases focused on the fact that the FAA's provisions were im-
portant and often outcome-determinative, and therefore substantive.
Since Erie required federal courts to apply state substantive laws in
diversity cases,49 the FAA should not be applied in federal diversity
cases. The Supreme Court addressed this concern in its 1967
landmark decision, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufac-
turing Co.5" In Prima Paint, Flood & Conklin, a New Jersey corpora-
tion, agreed by contract to perform certain services for and not to
compete with Prima Paint, a Maryland corporation.5 ' The contract
38. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 199.
41. The American Arbitration Association (AAA) is a leading provider of conflict manage-
ment and dispute resolution services. American Arbitration Association, http://www.adr.org/
(last visited 1/30/07).
42. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 199.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 199-200.
46. Even though the contract stipulated New York law would apply, that provision per-
tained to the actual arbitration and not to the determination of whether the agreement to arbi-
trate could be revoked. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 198 (1956).
47. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202-03.
48. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 23 (1984).
49. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
50. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
51. Id. at 397.
5
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contained an arbitration clause, which required any dispute arising
from the contract to be settled in New York City in accordance with
the rules of the American Arbitration Association.52 Flood & Conk-
lin sent Prima Paint a Notice of Intention to Arbitrate pursuant to the
New York Arbitration Act, contending that Prima Paint had failed to
make a payment under the contract. 3 Prima Paint invoked diversity
jurisdiction and brought suit in federal district court to rescind the
entire contract on the ground of fraud. 4 Therefore, the central issue
was "whether a claim of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract
[containing an arbitration provision] is to be resolved by the federal
court, or whether the matter is to be referred to the arbitrators. '55
The Court ruled that the arbitrators should resolve such a dispute.56
In making its decision, the Court highlighted three key provisions of
the FAA. Section 2 provides that a written provision for arbitration
"in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract."57 Section 3 requires a federal court in which suit has
been brought "upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agree-
ment in writing for such arbitration" to stay the court action pending
arbitration. 8 Section 4 directs a federal court to order arbitration
once it is satisfied that an agreement for arbitration has been made
and not honored.59 In Bernhardt, the Court had previously held that
the stay provided by section 3 was only applicable to contracts cov-
ered by sections 1 and 2.60 The scope of section 3 covered maritime
transactions and contracts evidencing transactions involving com-
merce.61 The Court followed the same reasoning in Prima Paint. The
Court upheld the stay because it deemed the contract between Flood
& Conklin and Prima Paint was a contract "involving commerce."
The contract was inextricably tied to the transfer of manufacturing
and selling operations from New Jersey to Maryland and to the con-
tinuing operations of an interstate manufacturing and wholesaling
business.62 The Court reasoned that the federal court was bound to
apply rules enacted by Congress with respect to matters over which it
52. Id. at 398.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 402.
56. Id. at 404.
57. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.S. § 2 (2007).
58. 9 U.S.C.S. § 3.
59. 9 U.S.C.S. § 4.
60. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956).
61. 9 U.S.C.S. § 2.
62. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967).
6
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has legislative power.63 Since the Court determined that the contract
between Flood & Conklin and Prima Paint involved interstate com-
merce, it fell within the authority of Congress under the Commerce
Clause. 64 The Court thus framed the question not as whether Con-
gress could fashion substantive rules in diversity cases, but whether
Congress could prescribe how federal courts are to conduct them-
selves with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has
power to legislate. 65 Essentially, the Court determined that the FAA
applied in diversity cases because Congress had so intended.66
The Court still had to determine why an arbitrator was entitled to
hear the dispute rather than a court. In its reasoning, the Court cre-
ated the Separability Doctrine by applying an earlier Second Circuit
decision in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc. 67 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Robert Lawrence Co.
that an arbitration agreement is separable from the rest of the con-
tract.68 The court reasoned that section 2 of the FAA did not purport
to apply to the contract as a whole but rather the specific provision of
arbitration in maritime transactions and contracts involving com-
merce.69 The Supreme Court supported its Doctrine of Separability
through section 4 of the FAA. Under section 4, the federal court is
instructed to order arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that "the
making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply is not
in issue. ''70 The language of the statute, according to the Court, did
not permit federal courts to consider claims of fraud in the induce-
ment of a contract.7 The Court held that in passing upon a section 3
application for a stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal court may
consider only issues relating to the making and performance of the
agreement to arbitrate.72
Justice Black wrote a lengthy dissent to the Court's decision in
Prima Paint, which set the tone for future discord in regards to the
application and scope of the FAA. The Separability Doctrine, as
adopted by the Court, preempted state law to the contrary. Justice
Black worried that the Court's adoption of the rule went against the
63. Id. at 406.
64. The United States Constitution empowers Congress to regulate commerce among the
several States. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
65. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405.
66. See Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271 (1995) (discussing
the holding of Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405).
67. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402 (citing Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.,
271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959)).
68. Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d. at 409-10.
69. Id.
70. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.S. § 4 (2007).
71. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404.
72. Id.
7
Groesser: Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna: The Latest Example of Ho
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2007
2007] BUCKEYE CHECK CASHING, INC. V. CARDEGNA 257
design of the FAA to provide a procedural remedy that would not
interfere with state substantive law.7 3 Justice Black argued that sec-
tions 2 and 3 of the FAA assume the existence of a valid contract.74
Justice Black referred to the legislative history of the FAA in his argu-
ment against the Separability Doctrine established in Prima Paint.
According to Justice Black, the legislative history indicated that the
Act was not meant to cover contracts produced through unequal bar-
gaining power, even with a valid arbitration provision.75 Congress'
concerns regarding these forms of contracts did not contemplate une-
qual bargaining power towards the arbitration provision alone, but to
the contract as a whole. Justice Black commented that Prima Paint
would not have executed any contract, including the arbitration
clause, if it were not for the fraudulent misrepresentations of Flood &
Conklin.76 Therefore, an agreement to an arbitration clause obtained
by fraud was no more "voluntary" than an agreement obtained by
unequal bargaining power.
Justice Black also believed, based on previous comments from the
bill's sponsors, that they never intended the issue of fraud to be re-
solved by arbitration. 77 The sponsors, according to Justice Black, rec-
ognized two values in arbitration: (1) "the expertise of an arbitrator to
decide factual questions in regard to the day-to-day performance of
contractual obligations 71 8 and (2) the speed with which arbitration can
resolve disputes. 79 Arbitration served neither of these purposes when
rescission was sought on the ground of fraud. The Court was not con-
tent to hold that the FAA made arbitration agreements enforceable in
federal courts if they were valid and legally existent under state law.8°
The Court, instead, interpreted the FAA to give federal courts the
right to fashion federal law, inconsistent with state law, to determine
whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable.81
Prior to 1925, federal courts would give damages for the breach of
an arbitration agreement, but refused to specifically enforce them.82
Therefore, according to Justice Black, Congress' limited purpose for
73. Id. at 411 (Black, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 412-13.
75. Id. at 414 (citing Hearing on S.4213 and 4214 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee of the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 6 (1923) (remarks of Senator Walsh)).
76. Id. at 415.
77. Id.
78. Id. See also Julis H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12
VA. L. REV. 265, 281 (1926) (arguing that arbitration is suited for resolving ordinary disputes
between merchants, such as disputes over quantity and time of delivery, but arbitration is not a
proper remedy for deciding major points of law, like constitutional questions).
79. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 415.
80. Id. at 422.
81. Id.
82. Id.
8
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enacting the FAA was to provide a party to such an arbitration agree-
ment a remedy formerly denied him.83 Justice Black viewed arbitra-
tion under the FAA as simply a new procedural remedy. In sum,
Justice Black's dissent in Prima Paint focused on the reality that the
Court forced Prima Paint to submit to binding arbitration of a void
and unenforceable contract without effective judicial review.84
After Prima Paint, the FAA applied to federal diversity cases in-
volving maritime transactions and contracts involving commerce.
However, the Court had yet to contemplate whether the FAA would
apply in state courts as well. In 1984, the Supreme Court addressed
this issue in Southland Corp. v. Keating.85 This case involved a
franchise agreement between Southland Corp. (franchisor) and Keat-
ing (franchisee), which contained a provision requiring arbitration in
accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association for
any dispute arising from the agreement.86 Keating filed a class action
suit asserting multiple claims against Southland Corp., including a
claim for violating disclosure requirements of the California Franchise
Investment Law.87 Southland petitioned to compel arbitration of all
the claims.88 The California Superior Court granted Southland's mo-
tion to compel arbitration on all claims except the Franchise Invest-
ment Law.89 The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's
refusal to compel arbitration.9" The court of appeal interpreted the
arbitration clause to require arbitration of all claims under the
Franchise Investment Law and construed the state statute not to inval-
idate such agreements to arbitrate.91 The court of appeal went further
and held that if the Franchise Investment Law rendered arbitration
laws involving commerce unenforceable, it would conflict with section
2 of the FAA and therefore be invalid under the Supremacy Clause.92
The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's ruling
and interpreted the Franchise Investment Law to require judicial con-
sideration of claims brought under the statute. The California Su-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 425.
85. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
86. Id. at 4.
87. Id. (The Franchise Investment Law provided that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provi-
sion purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provi-
sion of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void.").
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 5.
91. Id.
92. Id. (The Supremacy Clause is found in Article VI, 2 of the United States Constitution.
It establishes the Constitution, along with federal statutes, as the supreme law of the land which
state judges are required to uphold even if state laws or constitutions are in conflict with it.).
9
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preme Court concluded that the statute did not contravene the
FAA.93
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the California Su-
preme Court and reversed. The Court referred back to Prima Paint's
holding that the FAA rested on the authority of Congress to enact
substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.94 The Court in South-
land Corp. reasoned that the application of the Commerce Clause im-
plied that substantive rules of the FAA were to apply in state as well
as federal courts.95 According to the Court, the phrase "involving
commerce" in section 2 of the FAA clearly indicated that Congress
intended to invoke its Commerce Clause powers and apply the act to
both federal and state courts.96
In a dissent from the opinion of the Court, Justice O'Connor argued
that section 2 of the FAA, on its face, did not identify which judicial
forums are bound by its requirements or what procedures govern its
enforcement.97 Rather, the FAA dealt with these matters in sections 3
and 4.98 Section 3 required a stay for any suit or proceeding brought
in any of the courts of the United States that is referable to arbitra-
tion.99 Thus, according to Justice O'Connor, section 3 limited the
scope of the statute to the federal courts. Furthermore, section 4
specifies that a party aggrieved by another's refusal to arbitrate may
petition "any United States district court" for an order directing that
such arbitration proceed in the matter provided in the agreement. 00
The effect of the Court's ruling in Southland Corp., according to Jus-
tice O'Connor, was to make states follow the procedures of sections 3
and 4, which appear to be specifically directed at federal courts."'
Even though Prima Paint held that Congress had the power to legis-
late over contracts involving maritime transactions and involving in-
terstate commerce, the ruling did not express that the substantive laws
should be applied in both state and federal courts.102 This absence
was significant according to Justice O'Connor, since the heavily relied
upon Robert Lawrence decision had, in dictum, stated that the FAA
was a declaration of national law equally applicable in state and fed-
93. Id.
94. Id. at 11.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 14-15.
97. Id. at 22 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 23.
102. Id. at 23-24.
10
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eral courts.10 3 The Court in Prima Paint had a clear opportunity to
adopt this declaration, but tellingly chose to refrain.
The enactment of the FAA, according to Justice O'Connor, rested
upon Congress' ability to control the federal courts. Immediately af-
ter the FAA's enactment, the American Bar Association drafters of
the Act wrote, "[the FAA] rests upon the constitutional provision by
which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal
courts."1 °4 Justice O'Connor also addressed the Court's concerns of
"forum shopping" if the FAA did not extend to the state courts. No
forum shopping would be possible in cases not involving complete di-
versity since the federal court would not have jurisdiction. 10 5 In cases
involving complete diversity, both parties would have equal access to
the federal courts, so no advantage would exist.1"6 When a party re-
sisting arbitration initiated an action in state court, the suit could be
removed by the opposing party to federal court.10 7 In fact, according
to Justice O'Connor, Congress enacted the FAA for the specific pur-
pose of preventing forum shopping since a number of states at the
time had arbitration laws but the federal courts were not enforcing
them. 108
After Southland Corp., the FAA remained as federal substantive
law that preempted Erie through Congress' powers authorized in the
Commerce Clause. The FAA now applied to state courts as well, a
distinction from the Court's holding in Prima Paint.°9 The Separabil-
ity Doctrine adopted in Prima Paint distinguished an arbitration pro-
vision from the rest of the contract. Any claim not specifically
attacking an arbitration provision must be decided by an arbitrator.
Prima Paint only dealt with a claim of fraud brought in a federal court.
Thus in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, the Court had to
determine who should consider a claim of illegality in a case brought
in a state court.
ANALYSIS
The usurious interest rates within the contract between Cardegna
and Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. rendered the contract illegal and
void under Florida law.110 Cardegna sought a state remedy in state
103. Id. at 24.
104. Id. at 28 n.16.
105. Id. at 34.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 23.
110. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (Buckeye II), No. 04-1264, slip. op. at 1 (U.S.
Feb. 21, 2006).
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court. The Florida Supreme Court allowed Cardegna to avoid arbitra-
tion since enforcing an arbitration agreement within a void contract
would give life to a contract that is against state law.'1 ' However, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court's
decision. In a quite simple analysis, the Court reasoned that Congress
enacted the FAA to overcome judicial resistance to arbitration.'1 2
Section 2 of the FAA embodies the Separability Doctrine.113 It pro-
vides that challenges to arbitration agreements may be made "upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."' 4 Challenges are divided into two classifications: (1) those
challenging the validity of the arbitration agreement and (2) those
challenging the validity of the contract as a whole. 115 The former is
suited for the courts while the latter is suited for the arbitrator.' 16 Ac-
cording to the Court, Cardegna's claim of illegality applied to the con-
tract as a whole and therefore required arbitration. 7
The simplicity of Buckeye's analysis detracts from the complexity of
the judicially created entity that has emerged since the FAA's enact-
ment in 1925, an entity that has successfully and wrongfully eliminated
the rights of states established in Erie. To demonstrate the fault in
Buckeye, it is imperative to dissect its rationales individually. Buckeye
asserts that Congress enacted the FAA to overcome judicial resistance
to arbitration. 8 However, history indicates that Congress enacted
the FAA to overcome federal judicial resistance to arbitration. Prior
to the FAA's enactment in 1925, the state of New York enacted the
novel New York Arbitration Act of 1920 which required enforcement
of arbitration agreements and authorized the stay of legal proceed-
ings.1 19 Federal courts, however, had refused to compel arbitration in
diversity cases involving the New York statute. 20 Thus, the FAA's
purpose served to create a procedural remedy requiring federal courts
to enforce arbitration agreements that they had previously refused to
enforce. States were attempting to enforce arbitration and the federal
courts were hesitant. Ironically, the ruling in Buckeye shows the
twisted application of the FAA today; a state attempting to avoid arbi-
111. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (Buckeye 1), 894 So. 2d 860, 864 (Fla. 2005),
rev'd Buckeye II, No. 04-1264, slip. op. at 1.
112. Buckeye H, No. 04-1264, slip. op. at 1.
113. Id. at 5.
114. 9 U.S.C.S. § 2 (2007).
115. Buckeye 1I, No. 04-1264, slip. op. at 4.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 6-7.
118. Id. at 1.
119. See Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), affd, 5 F.2d
218 (2d Cir. 1924).
120. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 34 (1984); see Atlantic Fruit Co., 276 F. 319
(S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd, 5 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1924); Lappe v. Wilcox, 14 F.2d 861 (N.D.N.Y. 1926).
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tration is forced to arbitrate by the federal courts. The drafters of the
FAA could have required federal courts, in diversity cases, to adopt
the arbitration law of the state in which they sit. The FAA was en-
acted to make arbitration agreements enforceable even in federal
courts located in states that had no arbitration law.1 21 The goal of the
FAA was not to coerce states into arbitration, but to create a uniform
federal law that required federal courts to enforce the arbitration
agreements that they had previously refused to enforce. Therefore,
the statement in Buckeye that Congress enacted the FAA to overcome
judicial resistance to arbitration is dangerously broad and over-
encompassing.
Buckeye adopted the interpretation in Prima Paint that section 2
represented Congress' utilization of the Commerce Clause in the crea-
tion of the FAA. Without this interpretation, the federal courts would
not have been able to apply the FAA in federal diversity cases since
Bernhardt ruled that such cases were "outcome-determinative" and
therefore must abide by state law.122 If a state did not have a law
allowing the enforcement of arbitration agreements, a federal court
could refuse to enforce a valid arbitration agreement since the FAA
would not apply. The language of section 2 regarding maritime trans-
actions and contracts involving commerce allowed the Prima Paint
Court to use the Commerce Clause as a weapon against any accusa-
tion that federal substantive law could not overcome state law to the
contrary. This would satisfy the intent of the 1925 Congress to require
federal courts to enforce state arbitration laws.
Buckeye also adopts Prima Paint's Separability Doctrine. As dis-
cussed previously, the doctrine was a creation of an imaginative 2nd
Circuit judge in Robert Lawrence. There was no need to create a Sep-
arability Doctrine to fulfill the original intent of the FAA while satis-
fying the requirements of Erie and Bernhardt. The scope of section 2
of the FAA applies to any provision in a maritime contract or contract
involving commerce which contains an arbitration provision.1 23 Such
a provision or contract is considered valid, irrevocable, and enforcea-
ble save upon any grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract.1 24 Thus, in the context of the procedural intent
of the FAA, if a contract involving commerce had an arbitration pro-
vision covering the particular dispute at issue, it must be enforced un-
less a particular contract defense provides otherwise. The contract
defense would be applied to the contact as a whole and not just the
121. Id.
122. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
123. 9 U.S.C.S. § 2 (2007).
124. Id.
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arbitration provision. If the contract in Buckeye had been brought
before a Florida federal court, the federal court would have properly
denied arbitration since the contract defense of illegality would have
been successfully applied. But with the judicial creation of the Sepa-
rability Doctrine, an arbitrator would decide the contract's legality
through the power bestowed upon him by the very contract at issue.
The Separability Doctrine was an unnecessary creation of the judicial
system that has thoroughly corrupted the intent and application of the
FAA.
Prima Paint did not address whether the power granted to the FAA
by the Commerce Clause would extend to state courts as well as fed-
eral courts. Since the invocation of the Commerce Clause in section 2
allowed the Court to apply the FAA in federal courts as the 1925 Con-
gress had intended, it appears implausible that the FAA should be
applied to state courts as well, as that was not within the contempla-
tion of the FAA's creators. The Buckeye court relied on the South-
land Corp. court's reasoning that the phrase "involving commerce" in
section 2 of the FAA served as a necessary qualification on a statute
intended to apply in state and federal courts. 125 But sections 3 and 4
of the FAA specifically refer to federal courts. Section 3 requires that
"any suit brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under a written agreement for such arbi-
tration shall stay the trial until such arbitration occurs. ' 12 6 Congress
did not write "in" the United States but chose "of" to signify that the
procedure applied to federal courts. This makes sense when ex-
amined in the context of the FAA as a whole. Where federal courts
had previously refused to compel state-mandated arbitration in diver-
sity cases, the Supreme Court interpreted section 3 to require federal
courts to compel the arbitration. It does not make sense to make state
courts follow suit since that is not what the FAA explicitly states. Sec-
tion 4 allows a party, aggrieved by an alleged failure to arbitrate, to
petition any United States district court12 7 with proper jurisdiction to
compel such arbitration. 128 This application makes sense since a per-
son in a state that does not have a statute enforcing such arbitration
could petition the federal court to have the valid agreement enforced.
What does not make sense is that a person in a state that has a law
prohibiting the enforcement of an arbitration provision can use the
125. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (Buckeye II), No. 04-1264, slip. op. at 6-7
(U.S. Feb. 21, 2006).
126. 9 U.S.C.S. § 3 (2007).
127. The difference between "United States district court" and "court of the United States"
was merely a clerical change by the 1954 Congress according to H. R. REP. NO. 83-1981, at 8,
(1954).
128. 9 U.S.C.S. § 4 (2007).
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FAA to enforce the agreement in a state court. No where in sections
2, 3, or 4 does the FAA provide such a remedy.
Congress enacted the FAA during a time when federal substantive
general law was thought to exist. However, Erie refuted that belief
thirteen years later in 1938. Thus, it is hard to imagine that in 1925,
Congress created the FAA as a substantive law statute via the Com-
merce Clause rather than just enacting it as unlimited general substan-
tive law.12 9 The principal support for the FAA came from trade
associations dealing in groceries and from commercial/mercantile
groups in major trading centers. 130 Practically all who testified in sup-
port of the bill before the Senate subcommittee in 1923 explained that
the bill was designed to cover contracts between people in different
states who produced, shipped, bought, or sold commodities. 13 1 There-
fore, it is more likely that Congress wrote "involving commerce" not
to establish its right to make substantive law through the Commerce
Clause, but rather to specify with which types of contracts the FAA
was concerned. If Congress wanted to make the FAA a substantive
document, it would have simply used its assumed power through the
Commerce Clause to create general substantive law. Instead, the in-
tent of the FAA was to provide a procedural remedy.
To be true to the original intent of the FAA, Buckeye should have
left the decision to enforce the arbitration provision to the state of
Florida and its laws governing contracts. The usurious interest rates in
the contract between Cardegna and Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.
made the contract illegal and void under state law. That should mean
that the arbitration agreement, contained within the contract, is illegal
and void as well. The state will not enforce the dollar amounts or
other provisions in the illegal contract but, by the ruling in Buckeye, it
must enforce the arbitration agreement. The Court contended that
the Congressional intent of the FAA was to place an arbitration
agreement "upon the same footing as other contracts."' 32 Yet the ap-
plication in Buckeye placed the arbitration agreement above other
contracts. Where the contract as a whole is void and therefore its pro-
129. The Commerce Clause at the time of the FAA's enactment had limited power according
to the Supreme Court. At the time, the Court narrowly defined the meaning of "commerce"
(see, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)), restrictively described "among the
States" (see, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)), and held
that Congress violates the 10th Amendment when it regulates matters left to state governments
(see, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)).
130. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 411 n.2 (1967); see 50
A.B.A. Rep. 357 (1925).
131. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 411 n.2; see Hearing Before Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary on S. 4213 and S. 4214, 67th Cong. 4th Sess., 3, 7, 9, 10 (1923).
132. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th
Cong. (1924)).
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visions are void, the arbitration provision is not. This application is
contrary to what the "equal footing" likely meant. Since prior to the
enactment of the FAA, federal courts enforced contracts and their va-
rious provisions but not their arbitration provisions, a remedy was
needed to place arbitration provisions on "equal footing" with the rest
of the contract. That remedy became the FAA. Today, however, the
FAA is used in reverse. Where the entire contract is void, only the
arbitration provision is allowed to survive. Thus, where the FAA orig-
inally allowed arbitration to obtain equal status with the other provi-
sions in a contract, it now obtains a status far above those provisions.
The result requires states to force their citizens to arbitrate disputes
from contracts that are void by law and whose own state law prohibits
arbitration in such a matter. This result is not what Congress had in
mind in 1925. Congress desired a remedy, but the judicial system has
instead created a monster.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Arbitration Act began as a procedural remedy to re-
quire federal courts to enforce arbitration provisions they previously
had negated. Thirteen years after its enactment, Erie required federal
courts to follow state substantive law in diversity cases. Subsequently,
Bernhardt determined that the duty to arbitrate a contract dispute was
"outcome-determinative," thus placing the FAA in danger of being
unconstitutional in federal diversity cases. Prima Paint alleviated
those concerns by invoking the Commerce Clause when interpreting
section 2 of the FAA, thus allowing its provisions to escape Erie scru-
tiny. In so doing, Prima Paint also created the Separability Doctrine,
which defined when disputes should be heard by a court and when
they should be heard by an arbitrator. This creation was unnecessary,
unwarranted, and contrary to the original intent of the FAA. In
Southland Corp., the Court unjustifiably extended the FAA to apply
to state courts. This extension did not satisfy the original intent of the
FAA. Rather it was an extension of the Court's interpretation of sec-
tion 2 in Prima Paint, which enabled the Court to apply the FAA in
federal courts just as Congress had originally intended. The extension
in Southland Corp. went beyond the FAA's original intent and modi-
fied scope. That unwarranted extension has reached new levels as evi-
denced in Buckeye. What started as creative judicial license to enable
the FAA, which predated Erie and Bernhardt, to survive and accom-
plish its original intent has turned into an abuse of that license. Buck-
eye and its predecessor Southland Corp. gave a congressional act
power it never sought to obtain. The Court did the right thing in al-
lowing the FAA to survive in Prima Paint. The Court did the wrong
16
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thing in causing the FAA to grow and expand in undesired ways
through the Separability Doctrine and application to state courts.
Now the Court needs to do the right thing again by allowing the states
and their laws to continue to survive in the face of the suddenly all-
encompassing FAA. A revocation of the Separability Doctrine and a
vacation of the holdings in Buckeye and Southland Corp. would cut
this judicially created monster down to appropriate size.
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